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How much power does Congress have to regulate state democracy? More than it may realize, suggests Professor
Carolyn Shapiro, in her article, Democracy, Federalism, and the Guarantee Clause. Shapiro locates this untapped
power in the Guarantee Clause, which provides that "[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government." A significant body of scholarship has considered whether this clause empowers the
federal judiciary to review undemocratic state practices (P. 2), a question the Supreme Court has repeatedly answered
in the negative. But Shapiro flips the inquiry, focusing not on what the courts cannot do, but on what Congress can do.
She concludes that Congress can do a great deal, arguing that the Guarantee Clause gives Congress the
authority-and the duty-to intervene when necessary to ensure the democratic integrity of states.
Deploying a series of textual, functional, and historical arguments, Shapiro reframes the Guarantee Clause as a
structural principle with dynamic substantive content. Modern democracy scholars might put it this way: antidemocratic
practices in one state may produce negative "spillover" effects in another, causing an "antidemocratic spiral [that] is
contagious." (P. 5.) The Framers did not think in these precise terms, but they recognized the need to protect every
state by ensuring that each state had a similar form of republican government. Thus, Article IV Section 4 protects
"each" state from "Invasion" and "domestic violence," but guarantees to "every" state a "Republican Form of
Government." (Pp. 11-12.)
In the antebellum period, the federal government resisted calls to intervene in state affairs by enforcing the guarantee,
but after the Civil War the Radical Republicans claimed the Guarantee Clause empowered Congress to enforce new
democratic norms through Reconstruction. (P. 20.) Charles Sumner described the Guarantee Clause as a "sleeping
giant" awakened by the Civil War that gave Congress, more than any other clause, "supreme power over the states."
(P. 19.) From Reconstruction to modern times, the operational meaning of the guarantee has continued to evolve along
with American democracy itself. The nationalization of American politics has rendered each state more vulnerable to
antidemocratic spillovers from her neighbors. And the American polity has developed a more robust, universal, and
egalitarian conception of the structural elements essential to ensure popular sovereignty and representative
government, as evidenced by landmark legislation like the Voting Rights Act and constitutional amendments
guaranteeing political participation rights, such as the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifteenth Amendment, the
Seventeenth Amendment, the Nineteenth Amendment, the Twent-Third Amendment, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment,
and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
Shapiro's "guaranteeing power" (my term, not hers) would enable Congress to address something beyond the reach
of its other powers: structural problems with state democracy. The Elections Clause empowers Congress to regulate
the "Time, Place, and Manner" of congressional elections, and the Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress to
"enforce" its provisions "by appropriate legislation." The former clause permits comprehensive regulation, but only for
congressional elections. The latter permits regulation of state and local elections, but only to enforce individual rights in
a way the Court deems "congruent and proportional" and consistent with "equal state sovereignty." Neither permits
regulation of state institutions to vindicate structural principles.
These constraints on congressional authority limit the national policy debate. Take HR1, the omnibus electoral reform
bill the Democrats introduced after retaking the House of Representatives in the 2018 midterms. A key component of
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the bill requires every state to establish an independent redistricting commission (IRC). Another prohibits "d ubil
rnnning"-an individual shall not run the very election in which she runs as a candidate. But both the mandate and the
prohibition are limited to national elections. So Idaho must use an IRC to draw the single line that demarcates its two
congressional districts, but not to draw the electoral maps for its state legislature. And the Secretary of State cannot
administer the election if she is a candidate for Congress, but she can if she is a candidate for Governor.
Why limit these provisions to national elections? It's not because the democratic threats of gerrymandering and double
running are limited to national elections. It's because Congress only has clear authority to address these threats in that
context. But if Shapiro is correct about the scope and purpose of the Guarantee Clause, Congress may have the
authority to mandate commissions for state legislative maps and to prohibit double running in state elections, not to
enforce individual rights, but to guarantee a republican form of government.
Shapiro envisions a robust "guaranteeing power" that would recalibrate electoral federalism, enabling Congress to
regulate the states more aggressively than it presently does and otherwise could. She suggests this power should be
subject only to a "highly deferential" form of judicial review, one more deferential than what the Court applies to
exercises of congressional enforcement power. (P. 49.) Shapiro contends that current practices-like gerrymandering,
voter suppression, lame duck power grabs, and electoral maladministration-present the sort of democratic threats that
warrant such unprecedented congressional action. And she suggests that Congress can and should adopt a broad
array of preventive and remedial measures, such as national voter identification cards and national criteria for polling
places and voting machines. (Pp. 47-48.)
Shapiro's proposal invites future scholarly attention to the scope of the guaranteeing power and the role of the Court in
determining and policing its limits. On the one hand, the Court might struggle to satisfactorily explain why it cannot
enforce the guarantee itself while it can determine the scope of congressional power to enforce the guarantee. On the
other hand, as Shapiro herself recognizes, if the scope of the guaranteeing power presented a non-justiciable political
question, Congress would suddenly enjoy "unlimited power to impose on the states whatever government it deemed
republican." (P. 49.)
How could the Court constrain this power in a principled and determinate way, when the substantive content of the
guarantee is dynamic? I suggest it may be instructive to consider the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
Despite strident opposition from Justices Scalia and Thomas, the Court has consistently held that the meaning of
"cruel and unusual punishment" changes over time with society's "evolving standards of decency," so a punishment
accepted at the Founding, like the death penalty for child rape, may become impermissible when eschewed by a
sufficient number of states. Could an electoral practice, permitted at the Founding but now rejected by most states,
such as lifetime felon disenfranchisement, offend society's evolving standards of democracy?
Note that the dynamism of the Eighth Amendment generally operates in one direction-practices once permitted may
now be proscribed. But dynamism under the Guarantee Clause may operate in both directions-practices once
permitted may now be proscribed, while practices once proscribed may now be permitted. For example, Shapiro
suggests that Congress cannot prohibit Nebraska's use of a unicameral legislature or California's "ballot box
budgeting," even though the Founders may have considered unicameralism or direct democracy fundamentally
incompatible with a republican form of government, because even if such practices produce "significant state-level
dysfunction," they do not produce "antidemocratic spillovers." (P. 44.) Does the Court have the institutional
competence, and the requisite methodological tools, to make such determinations? And, more generally, to distinguish
permissible from impermissible exercises of the guaranteeing power?
In this article, Shapiro's focus is appropriately limited: her intent "is not to set forth a fully developed legal doctrine but
rather to lay out its conceptual framework." (P. 40.) Shapiro successfully makes a strong case that Congress can
regulate state democracy under the Guarantee Clause. I hope that future work, by Shapiro and others, will flesh out
these doctrinal details and further develop the case for a robust guaranteeing power.
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